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PRIVACY
Transatlantic Setback or Invitation to Dialogue?: EU Data Regulators’ Verdict
on Privacy Shield
By Peter Margulies  Friday, April 15, 2016, 9:52 AM
EU data protection authorities, the Article 29 Working Party (WP), have issued a comprehensive analysis of the proposed EU-US data
transfer agreement. Privacy Shield, as it’s known, would replace the Safe Harbor agreement struck down by the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) in Schrems. Since the CJEU in Schrems relied heavily on the WP’s earlier critical assessment of Safe Harbor, the WP’s
take on Privacy Shield has been eager anticipated. The good news about the WP’s analysis is that the gap between its views and the
proposed agreement may be bridgeable, despite the WP’s concerns with both the substance and procedure of US surveillance practices and
oversight. The bad news is that bridging that gap may require changes to section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, as well as rethinking of
the State Department Ombudsperson position that Privacy Shield relies on for oversight of US surveillance. 
The WP repeatedly praises the improvements made in Privacy Shield, and recognizes the panoply of protections provided under US law,
including the review of government certi½cations by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). The WP’s careful analysis of US law
represents a major evolution in the transatlantic dialogue about surveillance practices. That step in turn re¾ects the serious efforts
undertaken by US intelligence community of½cials to educate EU of½cials about the safeguards in US law, including the protections in place
as a result of the process initiated by President Obama’s Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28). 
Yet dialogue is not unconditional approval, and the WP’s analysis also re¾ects ongoing concerns. (For a cogent analysis of related concerns
by a US privacy advocate, see Faiza Patel’s analysis here.) On the substantive side, the WP expresses lingering anxiety that US surveillance
will be “indiscriminate.” PPD-28’s limitations on bulk collection, including its enumeration of purposes of surveillance such as combatting
counterterrorism and proliferation of WMDs, do not wholly alleviate those anxieties. In particular, the WP singles out a subject targeted
noted by Tim Edgar here: section 702’s de½nition of foreign intelligence information as including matters relating to the “foreign affairs” of
the United States. Although, earlier, I had questioned Tim’s emphasis on this provision, the WP’s concerns suggest that he may be right. U.S.
of½cials maintain that section 702 does not entail bulk collection, since collection under this provision is based on speci½c selectors. 
However, the WP observed that section 702’s text did not require the use of selectors, or provide any standards for choosing selection terms.
That absence of statutory direction highlights the amorphous character of section 702’s “foreign affairs” authority.
To deal with the “uncertainty” that the WP attaches to the scope of surveillance permitted by this provision, Congress may wish to further
cabin the “foreign affairs” prong of section 702 surveillance when it takes up reauthorization of the statute in 2017. As an alternative, the US
intelligence community may wish to publicly convey to the EU a limiting interpretation of the “foreign affairs” prong. 
On the procedural side, the WP doubts the independence of the State Department Ombudsperson designated as furnishing oversight under
Privacy Shield. (See my analysis here.) The WP notes correctly that the Ombudsperson will serve at the President’s pleasure, as do other
political appointees at cabinet departments. Moreover, the WP observes, the Privacy Shield agreement does not specify the powers of the
Ombudsperson, including access to evidence and authority to bind the US intelligence community. In addition, the WP suggests that the
current mechanism for forwarding EU residents’ privacy complaints to the Ombudsperson is inadequate; the best approach, according to the
WP, is to lodge this responsibility with the authors of the WP analysis: EU data protection authorities. At ½rst blush, this suggestion might
seem self-serving; however, EU data regulators’ experience with privacy issues makes them logical candidates for this role. 
While the WP’s complaint-forwarding recommendation might be an easy ½x, creating a new, truly independent position in the executive
branch may be dif½cult, because of the need for congressional buy-in. Another option is a larger oversight role for the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), which the WP singles out for special praise. The WP commends the PCLOB for its willingness to disagree
with the President of the United States on the domestic bulk collection of metadata, which has now been taken out of government hands by
the USA Freedom Act. As the WP observes, the PCLOB has the statutory responsibility to “ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately
considered” in US counterterrorism laws, rules, and policies. Furthermore, Congress established the PCLOB as an independent agency within
the executive branch. These attributes seem well-tailored to the WP’s prescriptions. Perhaps US negotiators, who have already recognized
that the Ombudsperson will work closely with the PCLOB, should designate the PCLOB for a more central oversight role. That role would be
a departure for the PCLOB, but would dovetail with the statute establishing the Board. Moreover, that move would not require additional
legislative action—a major plus in this era of gridlock. 
Privacy Paradox: Rethinking Solitude
In short, US movement on the section 702 “foreign affairs” prong and bolstering of independent oversight would signal engagement with
the WP’s serious study. Moves in this direction could well bring the WP on board. Alternatively, the US and the European Commission might
proceed without the WP’s blessing. But that path is perilous, given the CJEU’s reliance on the WP’s verdict. A data sharing agreement that
cannot win CJEU approval will ultimately send the EU and the US back to the drawing board. EU-US data transfers are too important for such
a protracted exercise in futility. In the long term, accepting the WP’s invitation to dialogue is the wiser course.
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